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Abstract
This note contains some initial work on attempting to bring recent developments in the foundations of
quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wavefunction within the scope of more logical and structural
methods. A first step involves generalising and reformulating a criterion for the reality of the wavefunction
proposed by Harrigan & Spekkens, which was central to the PBR theorem. The resulting criterion has several
advantages, including the avoidance of certain technical difficulties relating to sets of measure zero. By consid-
ering the ‘reality’ not of the wavefunction but of the observable properties of any ontological physical theory
a new characterisation of non-locality and contextuality is found. Secondly, a careful analysis of preparation
independence, one of the key assumptions of the PBR theorem, leads to an analogy with Bell locality, and thence
to a proposal to weaken it to an assumption of ‘no-preparation-signalling’ in analogy with no-signalling. This
amounts to introducing non-local correlations in the joint ontic state, which is, at least, consistent with the Bell
and Kochen-Specker theorems. The question of whether the PBR result can be strengthened to hold under this
relaxed assumption is therefore posed.
1 Introduction
The issue of the reality of the wavefunction has received
a lot of attention recently (see especially [28, 15]). In
this note, we show that insights may also be gained by
taking a similar approach to considering the ‘reality’ of
objects and properties in physical theories more gener-
ally, and in particular that such an approach can provide
a new perspective on non-locality and contextuality. The
first step will be to introduce a suitably general criterion
for ‘reality’ inspired by the Harrigan-Spekkens criterion
for the reality of the wavefunction [21], which was the
subject of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem [28].
The aim is to formulate the ideas in a manner that can
allow for a deeper, structural understanding of what is at
play. Indeed, the initial motivation was to bring consider-
ations of this kind within the scope of the methods of the
unified sheaf-theoretic approach to non-locality and con-
textuality [2, 4, 26]. The resulting, more general criterion
has several advantages. It avoids certain technical diffi-
culties, and due to its generality it can be applied within
any ontological physical theory: generalised probabilistic
theories [6], or classical mechanics, for example.
The initial investigations here also demonstrate that
such considerations can provide an alternative perspec-
tive on foundational questions in general. We find
an alternative characterisation of both local and non-
contextual correlations, as those that can arise from ob-
servations of properties that are ‘real’ in this sense. This
ties together the notions of locality and reality, bringing
to light another link between the Bell and Pusey-Barrett-
Rudolph (PBR) theorems [28], which deal, respectively,
with these properties.
We begin, in section 2, by presenting our generalisa-
tion and reformulation of the criterion for reality, which
requires minimal background. Much of the foundations
of quantum mechanics literature, including that concern-
ing recent developments on the reality of the wavefunc-
tion, deals with hidden variable or ontological models.
Therefore, before considering some uses of the more gen-
eral criterion in section 4, we will provide a brief review of
this framework in section 3. It has already been pointed
out that local hidden variable models can be subsumed
by the sheaf-theoretic framework [11, 12]; we will arrive
at another proof of this fact in section 4.
Finally, in section 5, we provide some comments on
the property of preparation independence, which first ap-
peared as one of the assumptions of the PBR theorem.
We show that the assumption, which is crucial to the
theorem, is analogous to Bell locality in a precise sense;
yet another link between the Bell and PBR theorems.
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We propose a weakening of this assumption to one anal-
ogous to no-signalling [18], which we believe can still be
well-motivated. It is not clear, however, if it is possible
to strengthen the PBR theorem so that its result still
holds under the less strict assumption. Certainly, such
a strengthening would require a different argument. We
will also mention that, by assuming preparation inde-
pendence, one can very easily prove a weakened form of
Bell’s theorem [7], a fact that may cast suspicion on the
strength of the stricter assumption.
2 A Criterion for Reality
In this section we will use the terminology of Harrigan &
Spekkens [21], which has been established in the litera-
ture. We begin by reviewing their criterion for the real-
ity, or onticity, of the wavefunction, which will then be
reformulated and generalised. For this, we need only pos-
tulate, for each system, a space Λ of ontic states. These
can be considered to correspond to real, physical states
of the system. The idea will be that objects or prop-
erties that are determined with certainty by the ontic
state are themselves ontic. The term ontic is meant to
describe that which relates to real as opposed to phe-
nomenal existence, though we do not propose to get into
a discussion of the suitability of the terminology here.
Similarly, objects or properties that are not determined
with certainty are said to be epistemic; the literal mean-
ing of the term is that which relates to knowledge or to
its degree of validation. The use of the term in [21] can
be taken to reflect the fact that objects and properties of
this kind are necessarily probabilistic and could thus be
assumed to represent a degree of knowledge about some
underlying ontic object or property. It should be borne in
mind, of course, that results relating to these definitions
will hold regardless of the physical significance attached
to them.
As well as the existence of an ontic state space, the
authors of [21] also posit the assumption that the prepa-
ration of any quantum state |ψ〉 induces a distribution
µ|ψ〉 over the ontic state space Λ for that system, speci-
fying the probabilities for the system to be in each ontic
state given that it has been prepared in this way.
Definition 1 (Harrigan & Spekkens [21]). If, for all
wavefunctions |ψ〉 6= |φ〉 of any system, the induced dis-
tributions µ|ψ〉 and µ|φ〉 have non-overlapping supports,
the wavefunction is said to be ontic. Otherwise, there ex-
ist some |ψ〉 6= |φ〉 such that µ|ψ〉(λ) > 0 and µ|φ〉(λ) > 0
for some λ ∈ Λ, and the wavefunction is said to be epis-
temic.
We now present a more general reformulation of the
definition. As we will see, this can be applied to any ob-
ject or property. Though the wavefunction would more
usually be considered to be (at least) a mathematical ob-
ject rather than a property of a system, for simplicity we
only refer to properties from now on.
Definition 2. A V-valued property over Λ is a func-
tion f : Λ → D(V), where D(V) is the set of probability
distributions over V. The property is said to be ontic in
the special case that, for all λ ∈ Λ, the distribution f(λ)
over V is a delta function. Otherwise, it is said to be
epistemic.
Another way of stating this is that ontic properties
are generated by functions f̂ : Λ → V ; i.e. they map
each ontic state to a unique value. For epistemic prop-
erties, however, there is at least one ontic state that is
compatible with two or more distinct values in V .
We now set about showing how these definitions re-
late, which may not be immediatelyz clear. Any V-valued
property f specifies probability distributions over V , con-
ditioned on Λ. Bayesian inversion can be used to obtain
probability distributions over Λ, conditioned on V , which
we (suggestively) label {µv}v∈V . Explicitly,
µv(λ) :=
f(λ)(v) · p(λ)∫
Λ f(λ
′)(v) · p(λ′) dλ′ , (1)
assuming a uniform distribution p(λ) on Λ. Note that
this is only well-defined for finite Λ, and that a more
careful measure theoretic treatment, which will not be
provided here, is required for the infinite case.
Proposition 3. A V-valued property over finite Λ is on-
tic (according to definition 2) if and only if the distribu-
tions {µv}v∈V have non-overlapping supports.
Proof. Suppose the property f is ontic in the sense of def-
inition 2, let λ ∈ Λ, and let v, v′ ∈ V such that v 6= v′. As-
sume for a contradiction that µv(λ) > 0 and µv′(λ) > 0.
Then, by (1), f(λ)(v) > 0 and f(λ)(v′) > 0; but since f
is ontic,
vλ = v 6= v′ = vλ,
where vλ := f̂(λ).
Conversely, suppose that the distributions {µv}v∈V
have non-overlapping supports and assume for a contra-
diction that f(λ)(v) > 0 and f(λ)(v′) > 0. Then, by (1),
µv(λ) > 0 and µv′(λ) > 0.
One way of thinking about this correspondence is as
a special case of the dual equivalence between the cat-
egory of von Neumann algebras and ∗-homomorphisms
and the category of measure spaces and measurable func-
tions [22].
To illustrate, we provide a couple of simple examples
of ontic and epistemic properties.
Example 4 (Classical Mechanics). The phase space of
a system is taken to be the ontic state space. Classical
mechanical observables (energy, momentum, etc.) are
represented by real-valued functions on phase space, and
are therefore ontic.
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Example 5 (Fuzzy Measurement). Consider an ex-
periment in which a bag is prepared containing two
coins, which can be green or white, with equal proba-
bility, but are otherwise identical. We claim that the
process of removing one and checking its colour mea-
sures an epistemic property. If the ontic states are
Λ = {GG,GW,WG,WW}, the property cannot be rep-
resented by a {G,W}-valued function on Λ. Given the
ontic state GW , for example, both G and W are compat-
ible, and can arise with equal probability.
In this second example, the property that is being
measured is, according to the present definition, epis-
temic with respect to the state of the bag; it might also
be said the example describes a fuzzy measurement on
the state of the bag.
Definition 2 has several advantages.
• It is fully general and can be applied to any object
or property in any ontological theory.
• It avoids measure theoretic problems relating to
sets of measure zero that are inherent to the origi-
nal.
• It is mathematically straightforward and conceptu-
ally transparent.
3 Ontological Models
We are concerned with theories that give operational pre-
dictions for outcomes to measurements; we refer to sets
of such predictions as empirical models. Quantum me-
chanics is one such theory, which might be described op-
erationally by saying that we associate a density matrix
ρp with each preparation p, a POVM {Emo }o∈O with each
measurementm, and prescribe the probability of the out-
come o given preparation p and measurement m by
p(o | m, p) = tr(ρpEmo ).
We wish, more generally, to consider theories with
the same kind of operational structure. In order to do
so, we will use some notation that is similar to that of
the sheaf-theoretic approach. For each system we assume
spaces P of preparations, X of measurements, and O of
outcomes. There may be some compatibility structure
on the space of measurements, say M ⊆ P(X), specify-
ing which sets of measurements can be made jointly (in
quantum mechanics, this is specified by the commutative
sub-algebras of the algebra of observables). This infor-
mation encodes which kind of measurement scenario we
are working in: e.g. the Bell-CHSH model [14, 8], Hardy
model [19, 20], and PR correlations [27] all deal with
two-party scenarios in which each party can choose freely
between two binary-outcome measurements1. Again, we
additionally assume a space Λ of ontic states, over which
each preparation induces a probability distribution.
In an effort to simplify notation, we will use an over-
line to denote a joint measurement m ∈M or joint out-
comes o ∈ E(m) to that measurement; here E(m) is the
set of functions o : m → O. Readers familiar with the
sheaf-theoretic approach will recall that E : X → OX is
the event sheaf. On the other hand, m ∈ X and o ∈ O
denote individual measurements and outcomes, respec-
tively. Joint preparations and joint ontic states will be
treated similarly in section 5.
Definition 6. An ontological or hidden variable model
h over Λ specifies:
1. A distribution h(λ | p) over the ontic states Λ for
each preparation p ∈ P ;
2. For each ontic state λ ∈ Λ and joint measurement
m ∈M, a distribution
h(o | m,λ) (2)
over joint outcomes E(m).
The operational probabilities are then prescribed by
h(o | m, p) =
∫
Λ
dλ h(o | m,λ) h(λ | p). (3)
The terms ontological model and hidden variable
model are both used in the literature, but recently the
term ontological model has gained some popularity. It
may be a more suitable term in the sense that the ‘hid-
den’ variable need not necessarily be hidden at all: it
could be directly observable. In Bohmian mechanics
[9, 10], for example, position and momentum play the
role of the hidden variable. It also carries the connota-
tion that such a model is an attempt to describe some
underlying ontological reality.
Definition 7. A theory which determines the measure-
ment statistics for the ontic states (2) will be referred to
as an ontological theory over Λ.
We are especially interested in ontological models and
theories that can reproduce quantum mechanical predic-
tions. Trivially, the simplest such theory is quantum me-
chanics itself, regarded as an ontological theory.
Example 8 (ψ-complete Quantum Mechanics). The on-
tic state is identified with the quantum state. A prepa-
ration produces a density matrix, which is regarded as a
distribution over the projective Hilbert space associated
with the system. By construction, the operational proba-
bilities are those given by the Born rule.
Of course, quantum mechanics, treated as an ontolog-
ical theory in itself in this way, has certain non-intuitive
features. Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen provided one early
discussion of the fact [16]; but later results such as Bell’s
1This measurement scenario is referred to as the (2, 2, 2) Bell scenario.
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theorem [7] and the Kochen-Specker theorem [24] clari-
fied the fact that non-locality and contextuality are nec-
essary features of any theory that can account for quan-
tum mechanical predictions. In order to address these
issues, we point out some relevant properties that onto-
logical models may have.
Definition 9. An ontological model is λ-independent
if and only if the distributions over Λ induced by each
preparation p ∈ P do not depend on the joint measure-
ment m ∈ M to be performed.
We have already implicitly assumed this in definition
6, but it is worth making it clear since it is a crucial
assumption in all of the familiar no-go theorems. In a
λ-dependent model, on the other hand, the probabilities
of being in the various ontic states depend on both the
preparation of the system and the joint measurement be-
ing performed, and we would have h(λ | p,m) rather than
h(λ | p) in equation (3).
Definition 10. An ontological model is deterministic if
and only if for each λ ∈ Λ and set of compatible measure-
ments m ∈M there exists some joint outcome o ∈ E(m)
such that h(o | m,λ) = 1.
In such a model, the outcome to any measurement
that can be performed on an ontic state is determined
with certainty.
For any distribution h(o | m,λ) over joint outcomes
o ∈ E(m) to the joint measurement m ∈ M on the ontic
state λ ∈ Λ, we can find a distribution h(o | m,λ) over
outcomes o ∈ O to any individual measurement m ∈ m
by marginalisation.
Definition 11. An ontological model is parameter-
independent if and only if the probability distribution
h(o | m,λ) over O is well-defined for each m ∈ X and
λ ∈ Λ.
By well-definedness we mean that the same marginal
distribution h(o | m,λ) is obtained regardless of which
set of joint of measurements we marginalise from (in the
case that m ∈ m and m ∈ m′ for example). Parameter
independence thus asserts that the probabilities of out-
comes to a particular measurement do not depend on the
other measurements being performed. Essentially, it im-
poses no-signalling [18] with respect to the ontic states.
Definition 12. An ontological model is local/non-
contextual if and only if it is both deterministic and
parameter-independent; empirical correlations are local
(non-contextual) if and only if they can be realised by a
local (non-contextual) model.
This says that for each ontic state there is a certain
outcome to any measurement that can be performed, and
that this does not depend on which other measurements
are made. The term local is generally only used when
the system being modelled is spatially distributed; where
such an arrangement is not assumed, the model is said
to be non-contextual.
We draw attention to the fact that another definition
of locality that is common in the literature concerns the
factorisability of the distributions
h(o | m,λ) =
∏
m∈m
h(o | m,λ). (4)
While the present definition may be less familiar, it is
important to note that these definitions were shown to
be equivalent, in the sense that they generate the same
sets of empirical models, in [2], which built on work by
Fine [17] that was specific to the (2, 2, 2) Bell scenario.
4 Observable Properties
If we assume that the outcomes of measurements provide
the values of properties of a system, then for each mea-
surementm ∈ X there should exist anO-valued property
fm : Λ → D(O) such that fm(λ)(o) = h(o | m,λ) for all
λ ∈ Λ and o ∈ O.
Definition 13. The observable properties of an on-
tological model h over Λ are the O-valued properties
fm : Λ→ D(O) given by
fm(λ)(o) := h(o | m,λ) (5)
for each m ∈ X such that the marginal h(o | m,λ) is
well-defined.
Theorem 14. An ontological model is local/non-
contextual if and only if all measurements are of ontic
observable properties.
Proof. First, we claim that a model is deterministic if
and only if its observable properties are ontic. This holds
since, by (5),
h(o | m,λ) = 1 ⇔ fm(λ)(o) = 1.
Next, we claim that a model is parameter independent
if and only if all measurements are of observable proper-
ties. This holds since, by definition 13, all measurements
are of observable properties if and only if all marginals
h(o | m,λ) are well-defined. The result follows.
This is another characterisation of locality, which
falls out easily from the definitions. It is similar to the
Kochen-Specker [24] or topos approach [23] treatment
of non-contextuality. It can provide an alternative and
sometimes simpler approach to certain results. The first
result we mention shows that local ontological models
have a canonical form. In fact, it shows that local on-
tological or hidden variable models can equivalently be
expressed as distributions over the set of global assign-
ments. (In this sense it shows how local ontological mod-
els are subsumed by the sheaf-theoretic approach.) It
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has recently been proved in measure theoretic generality
[12], and can also be seen to generalise earlier work by
Fine [17]. An interesting, related point is that, by allow-
ing for negative probabilities, these canonical models can
also generate all no-signalling correlations [2, 3, 25].
Theorem 15. Local models can be expressed in a canon-
ical form, with an ontic state space Ω := E(X), and prob-
abilities
h(o | m,ω) =
∏
m∈m
δ (ω(m), o(m))
for all m ∈M, o ∈ E(m), and ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. By theorem 14, a local model h over Λ has a
set {f̂m : Λ → O}m∈X of ontic observable properties.
For each λ ∈ Λ, we define a function ωλ ∈ E(X) by
ωλ(m) := f̂m(λ). Then the function c : Λ → E(X) de-
fined by c(λ) := ωλ takes the original to the canonical
ontic state space.
We first prove the claim that if λ, λ′ ∈ c−1(ω) for
some ω ∈ E(X) then
h(o | m,λ) = h(o | m,λ′)
for all m ∈ M and o ∈ E(m). Since λ, λ′ ∈ c−1(ω), then
ωλ = ωλ′ , and therefore f̂m(λ) = f̂m(λ
′) for all m ∈ X .
It follows that
h(o | m,λ) =
∏
m∈m
h(o(m) | m,λ)
=
∏
m∈m
fm(λ) (o(m))
=
∏
m∈m
δ
(
f̂m(λ), o(m)
)
=
∏
m∈m
δ
(
f̂m(λ
′), o(m)
)
= · · ·
= h(o | m,λ′),
where the first equality can be shown to hold by locality.
The canonical model h over Ω is defined by
h(o | m,ω) := h(o | m,λω)
and
h(ω | p) :=
∑
λ∈c−1(ω)
h(λ | p)
for all m ∈ M, o ∈ E(X), ω ∈ Ω, λ ∈ Λ, and any
λω ∈ c−1(ω). The canonical model realises the same
operational probabilities as the original, since∑
ω∈Ω
h(o | m,ω)h(ω | p)
=
∑
ω∈Ω

h(o | m,λω) ∑
λ∈c−1(ω)
h(λ | p)


=
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
λ∈c−1(ω)
h(o | m,λ)h(λ | p)
=
∑
λ∈Λ
h(o | m,λ)h(λ | p),
where the second equality holds by the previous claim.
Moreover, the operational probabilities can be simplified
as follows.
h(o | m,ω) = h(o | m,λω)
=
∏
m∈m
δ
(
f̂m(λω), o(m)
)
=
∏
m∈m
δ (ω(m), o(m))
The next proposition will not be surprising in light of
the EPR argument [16]. It shows that if one were to take
the view that quantum mechanics is ψ-complete then all
non-trivial observables are epistemic or inherently prob-
abilistic. Indeed, we can obtain a re-statement of the
EPR result as a corollary.
Proposition 16. Any non-trivial quantum mechanical
observable is epistemic with respect to ψ-complete quan-
tum mechanics.
Proof. Any observable Aˆ 6= I has eigenvectors, say |v1〉
and |v2〉, corresponding to distinct eigenvalues, say o1
and o2. Consider any state |ψ〉 such that 〈v1|ψ〉 > 0 and
〈v2|ψ〉 > 0. In a ψ-complete model, the wavefunction is
the ontic state, so λ = |ψ〉. Then
f
Aˆ
(λ)(o1) = h(o1 | Aˆ, λ) = |〈v1|ψ〉|2 > 0,
and similarly f
Aˆ
(λ)(o2) > 0. Therefore fAˆ is epis-
temic.
Corollary 17 (EPR). Under the assumption of locality,
quantum mechanics cannot be ψ-complete.
Proof. By proposition 16, any non-trivial quantum ob-
servable is epistemic with respect to ψ-complete quan-
tum mechanics. Therefore, by theorem 14, ψ-complete
quantum mechanics is not local.
This is the same result that was argued for by EPR,
though this proof has more in common with an earlier
argument by Einstein at the 1927 Solvay conference [5],
and also with a more recent, general treatment found in
[13] and in [1].
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5 The PBR Theorem
In this section we briefly make some observations relat-
ing to the PBR theorem, which deals with the reality
(i.e. onticity in the sense of definitions 1 and 2) of the
wavefunction. One of the assumptions for this result is
preparation independence [28]:
systems that are prepared independently
have independent physical states.
The other assumptions are implicit in the present frame-
work.
Theorem 18 (PBR). For any preparation independent
theory that reproduces (a certain set of) quantum corre-
lations, the wavefunction is ontic.
The preparation independence assumption is con-
cerned with the composition of systems and has not ap-
peared in previous no-go results. We will attempt to
give this a more careful treatment. First of all, the PBR
theorem describes a preparation scenario. Generalising,
this can be thought of as a kind of dual to a measure-
ment scenario, in which the preparations P play the role
of measurements and the ontic states Λ play the role of
outcomes. Just as we had a compatibility structure M
for measurements, which in Bell scenarios allowed us to
chose one measurement from each site, we should in gen-
eral have a compatibility structure P for preparations,
which in the case of the PBR result allows us to chose
one preparation from each site. We should allow for joint
ontic states λ : p → Λ, just as we allowed for joint out-
comes. Similarly to before, we will take λ to denote a
tuple of joint hidden variables, and p to denote a tuple
of joint preparations, one for each site. The definitions
of an ontological model and the properties from section
3 can be modified in the obvious way to account for this
additional structure.
Definition 19. An ontological theory h over Λ is prepa-
ration independent if and only if we can factor
h(λ | p) =
∏
p∈p
h(λp | p) (6)
for all p ∈ P, where λp := λ|p.
Presented in this way, preparation independence (6)
in a preparation scenario is clearly seen to be analogous
to non-contextuality or Bell locality (4) in a measurement
scenario. An intriguing question is what happens if this
is relaxed to an assumption analogous to no-signalling,
in which we only assume that the marginal distributions
h(λp | p) are well-defined: a sort of ‘no-preparation-
signalling’ assumption.
Definition 20. An ontological theory h over Λ is no-
preparation-signalling if and only if the marginal proba-
bilities h(λp, p) are well-defined.
In this case, it is easy to see that the PBR argu-
ment of [28] no longer holds. It is true that the relaxed
assumption would allow for global or non-local correla-
tions in the joint ontic state λ; but perhaps, in light of
the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems, this should not
be so surprising. An important question that remains to
be answered, therefore, is whether by another argument
a result similar to (or indeed counter to) that of PBR
can be proved.
Another observation, which is also pointed out in [21],
is that onticity of the wavefunction is actually inconsis-
tent with locality. This can be demonstrated as a con-
sequence of what Schro¨dinger called steering [29]. If a
local measurement in the basis {|0〉 , |1〉} is made on the
first qubit of the state∣∣φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
then this can be considered as a remote preparation of
the second qubit in one of the states |0〉 or |1〉, and sim-
ilarly for a measurement in the basis {|+〉 , |−〉}. If the
second sub-system has an ontic state λ that is indepen-
dent of measurements made elsewhere, then λ must be
consistent with one state from each of the sets {|0〉 , |1〉}
and {|+〉 , |−〉}, but this contradicts the onticity of the
wavefunction.
We therefore arrive at the following theorem, which
we propose to think of as a weak Bell theorem, since it
draws the same conclusion as Bell’s theorem [7] but with
the extra assumption of preparation independence.
Theorem 21. Quantum mechanics is not realisable by
any preparation independent, local ontological theory.
Proof. This follows from the PBR theorem and the oc-
currence of steering in quantum mechanics.
The ease at which this result falls out may lead us to
be cautious of the strength of the preparation indepen-
dence assumption.
6 Discussion
We have presented a generalisation and reformulation of
the Harrigan-Spekkens criterion for the reality or onticity
of the wavefunction. The reformulation can be thought of
as a special case of the dual equivalence between the cat-
egory of von Neumann algebras and ∗-homomorphisms
and the category of measure spaces and measurable func-
tions. It has been seen to have several advantages: it
avoids measure theoretic technicalities relating to sets
of measure zero and is mathematically and conceptually
straightforward. Of course, it is also general enough to
apply to any object or property in any ontological theory.
The first obvious application of the criterion to an
object or property other than the wavefunction is to the
observable properties of a system. This led to a new char-
acterisation of locality and non-contextuality in terms of
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the nature of the observed properties. This can pro-
vide a useful tool for looking at foundational results: we
have used it to obtain a short proof that local ontolog-
ical models have a canonical form and to gain another
perspective on the EPR argument. The characterisation
is similar to the Kochen-Specker [24] or topos approach
[23] treatment of non-contextuality.
It is notable that the characterisation draws a connec-
tion between locality and onticity: these are the proper-
ties that are dealt with by the Bell and PBR theorems,
respectively. A further connection was found in theorem
21, which showed that a weakened version of Bell’s re-
sult can be obtained by an argument that combines the
PBR result with the incompatibility of steering and the
onticity of the wavefunction.
In relation to the PBR result itself, we have at-
tempted to give a more careful treatment of the as-
sumption of preparation independence, and made a con-
crete analogy between this property and locality/non-
contextuality. It is possible to relax the assumption to
something analogous to no-signalling, in which case we
have pointed out that the PBR argument no longer holds.
This amounts to introducing global or non-local correla-
tions in the joint ontic state, which at least is consistent
with the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems. An open
question is whether by another argument the result can
be shown to hold with the relaxed assumption of ‘no-
preparation-signalling’.
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